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Introduction
Recently, the United States Bankruptcy Court for District of New Jersey held in In re
Kara Homes, Inc., 363 B.R. 399 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007) that secured construction lenders of
affiliated chapter 11 debtors were entitled to expedited relief from an automatic stay of
foreclosure pursuant to section 362(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code because the court determined
each debtor constituted single asset real estate case under section 101(51B) of the Code. The
significance of expedited relief under section 362(d)(3) is it imposes an “expedited time frame
for filing a plan” of reorganization in chapter 11 for single asset real estate cases, which
historically are viewed as abusive postponements of foreclosure filed for the single purpose of
holding on to the property, encumbered by a “major lender who is grossly undersecured,” with
“no real hope . . . [of] a viable confirmable Chapter 11 plan.” In re Kkemko, Inc., 181 B.R. 47,
49, 51 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995). The expedited time frame requires a debtor to file a reasonable
plan of reorganization or commence making monthly payments either within 90 days after an
entry of order for relief by the creditor or if there is an issue as to whether the debtor is a single
asset real estate case then 30 days after court determines a debtor to be a single asset real estate
case under section 101(51B) and if debtor fails to file a plan or commence payments, then the
automatic stay will be lifted allowing the creditor to foreclose on the property. See Kara Homes,
363 B.R. at 406–07; see also Janet Flaccus, Single Asset Real Estate Case and the Bankruptcy
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Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 2007 ARK. L. NOTES 83, 84 (2007) (explaining
requirements under section 362(d)(3) of Bankruptcy Code and its ramifications on debtor).
Furthermore, in other chapter 11 cases, there is no statutorily specified time period for
reorganization and thus debtors would want to avoid being determined a single asset real estate
in order to avoid the time constraints set by section 362(d)(3). See In re Philmont Dev. Co., 181
B.R. 220, 223 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995). Therefore, the Kara Homes approach as to what
constitutes a single asset real estate case significantly increases the level of difficulty for large
developers to reorganize in bankruptcy as current market conditions are hindering real estate
developers from honoring commitments to their lenders.
In order to constitute a single asset real estate case, the debtor must fall within the
definition of such a case under section 101(51B) which requires the asset to be (1) a “real
property constituting a single property or project, other than residential property with fewer than
four units” where (2) the “real property must generate substantially all of the income of the
debtor” and (3) “the debtor must not be involved in any substantial business other than operation
of its real property and the activities incidental thereto.”i Kara Homes, 363 B.R. at 404 (citing In
re Philmont Dev. Co., 181 B.R. 220, 223 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995)). The first two requirements of
the single asset real estate definition were satisfied according to the Kara Homes court because
each of the affiliated debtors was a “single real estate project” with developable land and a
housing plan and the real property generated “substantially all” of debtor’s income. Id. The main
issue of the case dealt with the third criterion of whether the debtor was involved in any
substantial business other than operation of the land or were these merely activities incidental to
operation of the real estate. Id. at 405. With regard to the third requirement, the affiliated debtors
argued their activities consisting of planning, design, marketing and maintenance were a
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substantial business, while the lenders argued that each affiliate debtor is simply an owner of a
sole real estate project with no business beyond improving the land for its eventual sale. Id. at
403. To understand the court’s decision in deciding in favor of the lenders and to understand why
the court may have over-broadened the definition of singe asset real estate beyond the current
case law’s application, the following discussion will present an overview of the case law relied
on by the court in defining single asset real estate, a brief discussion of the facts of Kara Homes
and the court’s take on the case law in applying it to the affiliated debtors. In addition, there will
be a highlight of a case distinguishing Kara Homes and possibly limiting the broader application
of single asset real estate under Kara Homes.

Background Case Law
To begin with, the court in Kara Homes relied on the definition of single asset real estate
from In re Philmont Development Co., which defined it as “a real estate project ‘owned by an
entity whose sole purpose was to operate that real estate with monies generated by the real
estate.’” Kara Homes, at 404 (quoting In re Philmont Dev. Co., 181 B.R. 220, 224 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1995)). Additionally, the Philmont court noted a typical single asset real estate case
constituted “an apartment building, office building, or ‘strip’ shopping center owned by an entity
whose sole purpose was to operate that real estate with monies generated by the real estate.”
Philmont, 181 B.R. at 224. Moreover, the term single asset real estate was used in the bankruptcy
setting for years to apply to numerous “single asset partnerships and corporations, formed only to
acquire and manage their one investment asset, [and who] have sought the protection of the
bankruptcy court” not in order to reorganize, but instead to further frustrate the efforts of
creditors by “postponing foreclosure.” Kkemko, 181 B.R. 50 (citing H. Miles Cohn, Single Asset
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Chapter 11 Cases, 26 TULSA L.J. 523 (1991)).
To determine whether the affiliated debtor’s activities constituted substantial business
and not activities incidental thereto under the third requirement of section 101(51B), the Kara
Homes court looked into several cases determining whether the real estate in question was a
“passive investment” or “a site of various income producing activities” which would qualify as
substantial business and not activities incidental to operation of the real estate. Kara Homes, 363
B.R. at 405 (citing In re Prairie Hills Golf & Ski Club, 255 B.R. 228 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2000)).
First, in In re Kkemko, Inc. it was held that a marina, providing boat storage and repairs, sales of
food and fuel, and availability of showers, pool and activities for the boaters constituted
substantial business other than mooring rentals and such activities were not incidental to renting
boat moorings. See Kara Homes, 363 B.R. at 405 (citing In re Kkemko, Inc., 181 B.R. 47
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995). Second, several cases involving golf courses, where debtors
maintained the property and provided some services avoided falling w/in the definition of single
asset real estate cases. See In re Prairie Hills Golf & Ski Club, 255 B.R. 228 (Bankr. D. Neb.
2000) (holding debtor was not single asset real estate case because it built and sold residences,
built roads to residences, built golf and ski areas leased to third parties, removed snow from golf
and ski areas and sold liquor in clubhouse); In re CGE Shattuck LLC, Nos. 99-12287-JMD, CM
99-747, 1999 WL 33457789 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1999) (establishing debtor owner of 18-hole golf
course containing several buildings on this land used for clubhouse and pro-shop failed to qualify
as single asset real estate case where percentage of revenue was derived from pro-shop, golf
rentals and other services); In re Larry Goodwin Golf, Inc., 219 B.R. 391 (Bankr. M.D. N.C.
1997) (concluding debtor owner of 18-hole golf course providing cart rentals, pool, concessions
and availability of undeveloped property for sale generated enough revenue to qualify as
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operating a substantial business and not holding property only for income). The third line of
cases dealt with hotels, which although are similar to apartment buildings derived income from
room rentals, did not constitute single asset real estate cases because of other services and
amenities provided by the hotels. See Centofante v. CBJ Development, Inc. (In re CBJ Dev.,
Inc.), B.R. 467 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996) (holding full service hotel’s bar, gift shop, restaurant and
maid service operations were substantial businesses other than mere rental of rooms); In re
Whispering Pines Estate, Inc., 341 B.R. 134 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2006) (concluding hotel operation
was substantial business other than mere management of real property). Therefore, in order to
qualify as a substantial business beyond mere operation of the real property for income, as would
an apartment building generate income solely from rentals, the debtor-owner must engage in
active endeavors and not just sit idly collecting rents.

In re Kara Homes Facts and Discussion
Kara Homes, a large New Jersey home builder, owned a ninety percent interest in each of
the thirty-two affiliated debtors, each of which owned separate real estate projects for
development and construction single family homes and condominiums. See Kara Homes, 363
B.R. at 400–01. Kara Homes and its affiliates filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy relief
under Chapter 11 and sought a declaratory judgment that they were not single asset real estate
cases as defined by section 101(51B). Id. at 402. In addition, the Kara Homes’ affiliated debtors
also filed a motion to extend the date for filing a reorganization plan or commence payments
pursuant to 362(d)(3) from the statutorily allowed thirty days to sixty days after a debtor’s status
as single asset real estate cases is determined. Id. Subsequently, both sides filed motions for
summary judgment.
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In their motion for summary judgment, the debtors argued each separate affiliate operated
a business “sufficiently active” to be excluded from definition of single asset real estate under
section 101(51B). Id. Specifically, the debtors claimed the “sufficiently active” business
consisted of each debtor acquiring developable, designing homes/condominiums suitable to that
land, arranging for construction of the homes/condominiums, and marketing and selling the
structures to generate cash, which required employees to be assigned to each particular property
by Kara Homes. In addition, each debtor had to acquire “site plan approvals or register with the
Department of Community Affairs and file Public Offering Statements” and the affiliated debtors
also built the common space, amenities and roadways. Id. at 402–03. In contrast, the lenders
argued each debtor owned a “single real estate project,” constituting its sole asset from which
revenue is derived solely by means of “improving and selling its real estate” and not by any other
business undertakings. Id. The court sided with the lenders concluding the business of home
construction and sales required all the activities claimed by the affiliated debtors to be substantial
business other than operating the real estate and therefore, the activities were not a substantial
business, but merely incidental to the operation of the real estate. Id. at 406.
In furtherance of its determination that the individual affiliated debtors were single asset
real estate cases, the court further expanded its reasoning to devise a “pragmatic approach” to
deciding what constitutes as substantial business separate from operating the real estate by
establishing “whether the nature of the activities are of such materiality, that a reasonable and
prudent business person would expect to generate substantial revenues from the operation
activities– separate and apart from the sale or lease of the underlying real estate.” Id. To further
illustrate this pragmatic approach, the court stated that a country club or hotel which provides
services such as catering, sales of goods, restaurants or casinos could be expected to raise income
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from those services separate and apart from the underlying income generated by the real estate.
However, despite the court concluding that the activities performed by the affiliated debtors were
incidental and that no reasonable business person could expect to generate income from the
activities conducted by the debtors without keeping in mind the eventual sale of the land, the
court still mentioned in a footnote that the activities performed by the affiliated debtors would
qualify as a substantial business if they were performed for third parties. Id., n. 5. For this
reason, the court found Kara Homes, Inc., the parent company, did not qualify as a single asset
real estate case because it did perform such activities for the affiliates and does not own the real
estate, while each of the affiliated debtors was found to be a single asset real estate case since the
activities were performed for themselves and not other home builders. Id. In this sense, the Kara
Homes court is inconsistent in its reasoning under the active/passive distinction of operating real
estate and in its application of the newly devised “pragmatic approach.” According to the
footnote, what the court is essentially admitting is that a reasonably prudent business person
would expect to generate income from such services as long as they were not being performed
for oneself as the owner of a real estate property, but instead for another landowner, which
simply put means these are “active” activities and not “passive” income collection.

In re Scotia Pacific: Distinguishing Kara Homes
Following the decision of Kara Homes, the Fifth Circuit, in In re Scotia Pacific Co.,
LLC, distinguished the Kara Homes reasoning to hold that the debtor (“Scopac”), a “special
purpose” subsidiary, owning 200,000 acres of land and a contractual right to harvest timber on
its own land and other land owned by affiliates did not fall within the definition of a single asset
real estate case because the timber harvesting operations conducted on the land were more than
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just “passive investment.” 508 F.3d 214, 216, 225 (5th Cir. 2007). Specifically, the debtors
planned, managed and implemented harvesting plans, were responsible for sales of timber and
re-planting of future timber, oversaw “varying harvesting requirements and environmental
prescriptions of each of the nine watersheds” on the land, and employs over 60 people. Id. at
217. When Scopac and several of its affiliates filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy to avoid
foreclosure, its noteholders moved to remove the stay under section 362(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy
Code arguing Scopac constituted a single asset real estate case. The motion was denied by the
bankruptcy court and the noteholders appealed claiming Scopac was a single asset real estate
case.
The court’s reasoning, primarily based on the passive/active approach to real estate
operations, noted that bankruptcy courts find single asset real estate cases in debtors “who have
no revenue from their property except the passive collection of rent from tenants and excluding
from its reach those entities that undertake and pursue various sorts of active economic,
commercial, and business activities on the property.” Id. at 221 (citing In re Club Golf Partners,
L.P., No. 07-40096-BTR-11, 2007 WL 1176010, at *2 (February 15, 2007)). When the
noteholders argued Scopac’s activities were of the passive investment type and similar to the
activities conducted by the affiliated debtors in Kara Homes under the “pragmatic approach,” the
Scotia Pacific court disagreed reasoning that sale of timber was different from sales of the
underlying land. Id. at 223. Moreover, to further support its distinction the court noted Scopac’s
activities were much more diverse than those discussed in some of the same cases cited by Kara
Homes pertaining to hotels and golf-courses. The court also looked into the legislative history of
the “1994 inclusion” of the “single asset real estate,” which stated such property was considered
to be held for “passive investment” such as a “‘single apartment house or condo complex.’” Id.,
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n. 7 (quoting 138 Cong. Rec. S8241-01, *S8264 (daily ed. June 16, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Reid)).
In further determining the meaning of single asset real estate, the Scotia Pacific court
established that even before the 1994 Act, this term was already recognized by courts to pertain
to debtors who used bankruptcy filing as a means of preventing creditors from foreclosing even
when reorganization was hopeless. Id. (citing Kkemko, 181 B.R. at 50). Thus, typical single asset
real estate case was where the debtor had only one asset encumbered by the secured creditor’s
lien, there are practically no employees or cash flow, and few or no unsecured creditors. Id.
(quoting Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. (In re Little Creek Dev. Co.),
779 F.2d 1068, 1073 (5th Cir. 1986). Scopac, on the other hand, engaged in “[s]ophisticated
operations . . . as planning, growing, and maintaining the timber as well as building and
maintenance of roads . . . . [and] Scopac's sale of timber is an activity which extends beyond the
sale or lease of the underlying land.” Id. at 224–25. Furthermore, the court cautioned against
expanding the single asset real estate case definition beyond its traditional meaning in order to
find Scopac as a single asset real estate case because this would broaden the “narrow exception”
to the general bankruptcy process and include within the definition “entities as owners of land or
mineral interests who operate sophisticated businesses such as mining, oil and gas drilling, and
large commercial farms simply by virtue of the debtor owning the land.” Id.

Conclusion
The original purpose of the expedited relief to creditors afforded by section 362(d)(3) for
single asset real estate cases was to address bankruptcy abuse by single asset partnerships and
corporations that typically acquired and managed a single developed property such as an
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apartment house or office building intended to passively produce income, but the decision of
Kara Homes brings large residential development companies within the statutory scope even
though their activities are not primarily passive investment. Since the affiliated debtors own the
underlying land, they would be deemed as a single asset real estate cases even if their operations
taken separately may qualify as substantial business because those operations are tied to the
ultimate sale of the land. See Craig M. Rankin & Daniel H. Reiss, Single Asset Real Estate, 30
NAT’L L.J. 12, col. 1 (2008) (“Because large developers often create a single-purpose entity for
each new project, many individual projects are in jeopardy due to the current credit crunch and
may become SARE debtors”). Therefore, possibly a developer could avoid being deemed a
single asset real estate case either by refraining from transferring single parcels of land or single
projects to affiliates or the affiliates could perform the above-discussed services for each other as
a possible loophole in the Kara Homes decision.

i

Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, section 101(51B) had an additional requirement of
the secured debt being no more than $4 million to qualify as a single asset real estate case, but
after the enactment of Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
(“BAPCPA), this limitation was removed. See Kara Homes, 363 B.R. at 404.
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